

Message Text

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00181 01 OF 03 191208Z

50

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00

H-03 INR-11 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04

PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07 DRC-01 /153 W

----- 047831

P R 191110Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 334

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0181

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: STRULAK JULY 17, 1974, PRESS CONFERENCE QUESTIONS
AND ANSWERS

SUMMARY: IN Q'S AND A'S AFTER STRULAK PRESS STATEMENT
(SEEP SEPTTEL), HE REPEATED COMMENT ON "FIRST STEP"
FLEXIBILITY, WITHOUT DISCUSSING ANY DETAILS, AND
SAID THAT FLEXIBILITY HAS BEEN SHOWN BY BOTH SIDES.
HE REJECTED IDEA THAT TALKS ARE DEADLOCKED AND EXPRESSED
PERSONAL VIEW THAT A COMPROMISE SOLUTION FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE
SOLUTION WAS STILL POSSIBLE. TEXT OF Q'S AND A'S FOLLOWS.
END SUMMARY.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00181 01 OF 03 191208Z

BEGIN TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS:

STRULAK JULY 17 PRESS CONFERENCE, Q'S AND A'S

1. Q: CONCERNING YOUR CONCEPT OF SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTIONS, CAN YOU TELL US WHETHER THESE REDUCTIONS WILL ALL TAKE PLACE AT THE SAME TIME, OR WHETHER THEY WILL TAKE PLACE OVER A PERIOD OF TIME IN THE SAME PHASE?

A: THERE ARE TWO POSSIBILITIES TO CONTEMPLATE THIS QUESTION: ONE IS WHAT I WOULD CALL THE APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE, THE OTHER IS THE TECHNICAL APPROACH. AS FAR AS THE APPROACH OF PRINCIPLE IS CONCERNED, OUR ANSWER IS "YES". WE CONSIDER THAT THERE SHOULD BE EQUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING. IF YOU TAKE THE OTHER APPROACH, OF COURSE THERE IS A POSSIBILITY TO ANSWER IT IN A DIFFERENT WAY AND SIMPLY TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE REAL SITUATION THAT MAY ARISE WHEN YOU AGREE ON SIMULTANEOUS REDUCTION.

2. Q: DID THE NIXON-BREZHNEV MOSCOW SUMMIT GIVE ANY NEW IMPULSES TO THE VIENNA TALKS TO OVERCOME THE DEADLOCK?

A: I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THE LAST PART OF YOUR STATEMENT FIRST, NAMELY "DEADLOCK", AND SAY THAT I DON'T AGREE THAT THERE IS A DEADLOCK HERE, AND I DON'T THINK THAT ANY OF THE DELEGATES SAY THAT THERE IS A DEADLOCK. SECONDLY, AS TO THE IMPORT OF THE MOSCOW MEETING AND OF THE MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE: I THINK THAT IT HAS A POSITIVE INFLUENCE, BECAUSE THERE IS A STRONG ENDORSEMENT OF OUR EFFORTS HERE, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE TALKS, AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLE BY WHICH WE ARE GUIDED HERE, THAT IS THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. AND OF COURSE, THAT IS A HELPFUL STATEMENT.

3. Q: CAN YOU SPECIFY THIS - ARE THERE SOME NEW PROPOSALS?

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00181 01 OF 03 191208Z

A: WELL, AS FAR AS THE NEW PROPOSALS ARE CONCERNED, AND THE OLD PROPOSALS, I THINK THAT I GAVE A PICTURE OF THAT IN MY STATEMENT. I COULD NOT IMPROVE ON THIS IF I TRIED IT NOW.

4. Q: SIR, AMBASSADOR, I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU: DO THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES BELIEVE THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD REDUCE IN THE RATIO OF ONE TO ONE?

THAT WOULD LEAVE AN ADVANTAGE FOR THE WARSAW PACT
TROOPS AND TANKS, RIGHT?

A: FIRST, I HAVE SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THIS ONE-TO-ONE APPROACH. I DON'T THINK THAT IS REALLY THE THING WE ARE SUGGESTING IN OUR DRAFT (PROPOSAL), FOR WHAT WE ARE SUGGESTING IS BASICALLY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE REDUCTION; AND THEN IT WOULD BE INCORRECT TO CONCLUDE THAT SUCH A METHOD OF REDUCTION WOULD LEAVE A PREPONDERANCE ON ANY SIDE, BECAUSE AS YOU KNOW OUR APPROACH IS A COMPREHENSIVE ONE WHICH WOULD AFFECT ALL THE COMPONENTS OF THE MILITARY CAPABILITIES. AND AS WE PRESUME THAT THERE IS SOME STABLE CORRELATION OF FORCES, TAKING ALL THESE FORCES INTO CONSIDERATION, THE RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS WILL CONSEQUENTLY NOT CHANGE THIS STABLE RELATIONSHIP. THE CONSEQUENCE WILL BE STABILITY, BECAUSE WE STILL GET LOWER CONCENTRATION OF FORCES.

5. Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, YOU TALKED ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF A FIRST-STEP SOLUTION, AND THAT THE EFFORTS MADE BY THE SOCIALIST STATES SHOW FLEXIBILITY IN THAT REGARD. CAN YOU TELL US WHETHER, IN THE FIRST STAGE, AS IT IS BEING DISCUSSED NOW, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE REDUCTION OF ALL FORCES, NOT ONLY OF GROUND FORCES BUT OF ALL FORCES, DOES THAT APPLY FROM THE VERY OUTSET IN YOUR CONSIDERATIONS AT ALL?

A: YES, I TRIED TO ANSWER THAT CONCERNING YOUR PREVIOUS QUESTION. WE MEAN THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS SHOULD TAKE ON OBLIGATIONS TO REDUCE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING.
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00181 01 OF 03 191208Z

THEN THE QUESTION REMAINS: HOW WILL YOU TRANSLATE IT INTO REALITY. THAT IS A QUESTION WHICH IS MUCH TOO EARLY TO ANSWER NOW, BECAUSE WE ARE STILL DISCUSSING THIS AT THE LEVEL OF PRINCIPLES.

6. Q: BUT THE DISCUSSION EMBRACES WHICH FORCES AS WELL. THIS IS STILL A CRUCIAL QUESTION?

A: YES. (Q. THIS IS ALL STILL SUBJECT FOR NEGOTIATIONS.) YES, THAT IS WHAT I HAVE BEEN TRYING TO CONVEY, THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH IS BEING DISCUSSED. AND THE DISCUSSION GOES ON.

7. Q: IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT THE WESTERN TROOPS ARE CONSIDERING TO "FREEZE" THEIR TROOPS. WOULD

YOU CONSIDER THAT AS A REALISTIC APPROACH?

A: WELL, FROM WHAT I SAID IN MY STATEMENTS, AND IN MY ANSWERS TO MR. WEILAN'S QUESTIONS, WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE OBLIGATION TO REDUCE BY ALL, ALL ELEVEN PARTICIPANTS, FROM THE BEGINNING.

8. Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, IS IT STILL REASONABLE TO LOOK FOR A BEGINNING OF REDUCTIONS IN 1975?

A: WELL, OF COURSE THIS IS A QUESTION OF SUBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT. BUT IN MY OPINION, THIS IS NOT BEYOND POSSIBILITY.

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00181 02 OF 03 191224Z

50

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00

H-03 INR-11 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04

PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07 DRC-01 /153 W

----- 047978

P R 191110Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 335

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0181

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

9. Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, AS YOU ARE COMPARING THE DISCUSSIONS

IN THE NOW FINISHED THIRD PHASE, OR THIRD ROUND,
AND COMPARE THEM WITH THE SECOND ROUND, WHAT ARE
THE DIFFERENCES? HAS THERE BEEN FOR INSTANCE
MORE TALK ABOUT CERTAIN TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF THE
PROBLEMS, OR HAS THERE BEEN ANY MORE TALK ABOUT
PRINCIPLES? ARE THERE ANY NUANCES?

A: WELL, THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AS ALL OTHER NEGOTIATIONS,
HAVE THEIR OWN LOGIC. SO THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE
THIRD ROUND IS REALLY A CONTINUATION OF THE ONES
WE HAD IN THE SECOND ROUND. OF COURSE, IT IS
NATURAL, AS YOU DISCUSS THINGS LONGER, AND YOU
DISCUSS THEM IN MORE DETAIL, YOU GO DEEPER INTO
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00181 02 OF 03 191224Z

THE MATTER. I THINK THAT IS A CORRECT EVALUATION
OF THE THIRD ROUND.

10. Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, ARE YOU GOING BACK NOW TO WORK OUT
NEW POINTS, OR DO YOU EXPECT A CONTINUATION AFTER
THE SUMMER ALONG THE SAME LINES AS UP TO NOW?

A: WELL, WE HAVE A BASIS FOR THE PROPOSALS IN THE
FORM THAT WE HAVE PRESENTED. ACTUALLY, WE HAVE
HAD A FLEXIBLE APPROACH. THE TWO ELEMENTS MAKE
FOR OUR NEGOTIATING STAND. THAT IN OUR OPINION
IS QUITE SUFFICIENT TO NEGOTIATE REALISTICALLY,
AND WITH SOME PROSPECT.

11. Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, YOU SAY THAT THE SOCIALIST
COUNTRIES STILL HOLD TO THE SAME BASIC POSITION
AS PRESENTED LAST NOVEMBER. HAVE YOU DETECTED
ANY CHANGE, OR CHANGE OF EMPHASIS, IN THE NATO
PROPOSAL?

A: WELL, I THINK A BETTER ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION
COULD BE GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR QUARLES, WHO WILL
HAVE HIS PRESS CONFERENCE IN TWO HOURS. I THINK
I HAVE GIVEN THE BASIC APPROACH TO THE WESTERN
STAND, THE WESTERN ATTITUDE, IN MY STATEMENT.

12. Q: WHAT I MEANT IS WHETHER YOU HAVE DETECTED ANY
CHANGE IN THEIR APPROACH. PROBABLY YOU COULD
ANSWER THAT BETTER THAN ANYONE ELSE.

A: WELL, IT WOULD RATHER BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO
COMMENT ON THESE PROPOSALS. BUT FROM WHAT I SAY
ABOUT THE STATE OF AFFAIRS AND ABOUT THE PRESENT
SITUATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT SHOULD BE
SUFFICIENT IN ITSELF.

13. Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, BASICALLY, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT YOU HAVE REACHED A POINT WHERE BOTH SIDES COULD GIVE WAY, OR COULD MAKE CONCESSIONS AND REACH SOME POINT OF A COMPROMISE? DO YOU ENVISAGE COMPROMISE OR CONCESSIONS BY EITHER SIDE?
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00181 02 OF 03 191224Z

A: WELL, COMPROMISE IS AN ACCEPTED MEASURE OF NEGOTIATIONS. IT DEPENDS, YOU SEE? WE HAVE OUR BASIC POSITION, WE HAVE SHOWN READINESS TO LOOK FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION - WE WILL SEE HOW OUR PARTNERS REACT TO THAT. AS I SAY, JUST ON THE CONTRARY, I DO EXPECT THAT IT IS STILL POSSIBLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT, AND THAT IS MY PERSONAL VIEW.

14. Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, HOW WOULD YOU CHARACTERIZE THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE VIENNA TALKS AND CSCE IN GENEVA? IS THERE A CERTAIN DEPENDENCE OF THESE TALKS ON THE TALKS IN GENEVA?

A: WELL, I DON'T THINK YOU CAN SPEAK OF DEPENDENCE HERE. THESE ARE TWO SEPARATE AND LARGELY DIFFERENT FORMS OF NEGOTIATION; THE PROBLEMS ARE DIFFERENT, THE POSSIBLE TIME-TABLE IS DIFFERENT - THE ONLY THING YOU CAN SAY, OF COURSE, IS THAT BOTH THESE NEGOTIATIONS HAPPEN TO TAKE PLACE IN EUROPE IN A POSITIVE SENSE. HERE YOU HAVE A CERTAIN RELATIONSHIP.

15. Q: DO YOU THINK THAT SUCCESS IN GENEVA WOULD HAVE INFLUENCE ON THE VIENNA TALKS?

A: CERTAINLY SUCCESS IN GENEVA WOULD BE HELPFUL. I WOULD REPLY IN THE SAME WAY THAT I ANSWERED YOUR QUESTION ABOUT THE SUMMIT MEETING. EVERYTHING THAT IS POSITIVE IN THE FIELD OF DETENTE CAN ONLY HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE.

16. Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, WOULD YOU SAY THAT YOU HAVE AT THIS STAGE BEEN DISAPPOINTED ABOUT THE LACK OF PROGRESS MADE SO FAR.

A. WELL, DISAPPOINTMENT IS A VERY RELATIVE FEELING, I SHOULD SAY. IT DEPENDS - CERTAINLY, ONE MIGHT HAVE DONE BETTER. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, AS I
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00181 02 OF 03 191224Z

TRIED TO CONVEY, THERE IS NO NEED TO DESPAIR.
THERE IS NO IMPASSE, NO DEADLOCK. WE ARE AT THE
DEFINITIVE POINT OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

17. Q: IF YOU ARE SPEAKING OF NEGOTIATIONS, AND NOT ONLY
DISCUSSIONS. IS THAT THE POINT YOU ARE AT?

A: YES, I WOULD SPEAK OF NEGOTIATIONS. THESE ARE
NEGOTIATIONS.

18. Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, DO YOU FEEL THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS
ARE SHARING THE DEGREE OF URGENCY IN THESE TALKS;
ARE THE TALKS MOVING FORWARD AT AN APPROPRIATE SPEED?

A: NOW THAT IS AGAIN A QUESTION OF SUBJECTIVE JUDGMENT,
I WOULD SAY. AS I TRIED TO CONVEY, WE CERTAINLY HAVE
SUCH A FEELING. WE ARE INTERESTED IN HAVING THESE
NEGOTIATIONS BRING RESULTS AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE.

19. Q: I AM STILL NOT CLEAR, MR. AMBASSADOR, HOW YOU
RECONCILE THESE TWO STATEMENTS. AT THE BEGINNING YOU
TOLD US THAT THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS
BASICALLY WHAT IT WAS EXPRESSED AT THE BEGINNING OF
NOVEMBER IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. AND YET YOU SAY THAT
THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE SHOWN GOOD WILL AND FLEXI-
BILITY. CAN YOU GIVE ANY CLEARER INDICATION JUST WHERE
THE FLEXIBILITY COMES IN. YOU HAVE SAID THAT YOU EXPECT
A RECIPROCITY OF OBLIGATIONS. ALL THESE ARE CONFLICTING
STATEMENTS, AND I DO NOT SEE WHY YOU ARE LOOKING FOR-
WARD TO THE NEXT ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. CAN YOU
CLARIFY THIS AT ALL. SERIOUSLY, WHERE IS THE FLEXI-
BILITY, WHERE IS THE MOVEMENT?

A. WELL, I TRIED TO CONVEY THAT THE FLEXIBILITY IS IN
OUR EFFORTS TO LOOK FOR A WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT SITUA-
TION IN THE FORM OF FINDING A FIRST CONCRETE SOLUTION
OF THE REDUCTION PROBLEM. THAT IS, TO LOOK FOR A FIRST
STEP THAT WOULD MOVE THE TALKS TOWARDS REDUCTIONS. AND
HERE, I THINK, THAT IS FLEXIBILITY. OF COURSE, IT GOES
WITHOUT SAYING THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED HERE WILL BE
A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 MBFR V 00181 02 OF 03 191224Z

20. Q: MR. AMBASSADOR, ONE HAS THE SUBJECTIVE FEELING

THAT YOU ARE SAYING LESS AND LESS, COMPARED TO SIMILAR
EXERCISES LAST YEAR. IS THAT A GOOD SIGN OR A BAD
SIGN?

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00181 03 OF 03 191234Z

50

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 ACDE-00 AECE-00 AEC-11 CIAE-00

H-03 INR-11 IO-14 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04

PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07 DRC-01 /153 W
----- 048064

P R 191110Z JUL 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0336

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0181

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

A. I DON'T SEE IN WHAT WAY I AM SAYING LESS. (IN YOUR
SIX PAGE STATEMENT, I THINK YOUR EXCELLENT ANSWERS WOULD
BE A GOOD TEXT FOR A DIPLOMATIC SEMINAR AT SCHLOSS
KLESHEIM. BUT I WOULD LIKE TO FOLLOW UP AN EARLIER
QUESTION, THAT THERE IS A GAP IN THAT FLEXIBILITY. YOU
HAVE THE SAME BASIC PROPOSALS. YOU SAY THAT AS CONCERNS
THE WESTERN SIDE THE RESPONSE HAS TO COME FROM MR.
QUARLES, AND THAT YOUR PROPOSALS ARE PRACTICAL. HOW
DO YOU EXPLAIN THAT?) WELL, I DO NOT ARGUE THAT WE
HAVE CHANGED THE BASIC APPROACH. BUT I DO NOT SAY
THAT THAT BASIC APPROACH IS UNACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER

SIDE, AND I TRY TO EXPLAIN WHY. THIS IS AN APPROACH WHICH DOES NOT AIM AT IMPAIRING ANYONE'S INTERESTS. SO WE COULD CONTINUE TO HAVE THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00181 03 OF 03 191234Z

AN ACCEPTABLE APPROACH. SECONDLY, ABOUT THE WESTERN APPROACH, OF COURSE I DO NOT DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF EITHER OUR APPROACH OR OF THE WESTERN APPROACH. AS YOU UNDERSTAND, THESE ARE CONFIDENTIAL NEGOTIATIONS. I HAVE GIVEN OUR GENERAL EVALUATION OF THE WESTERN APPROACH. AND THEN ABOUT FLEXIBILITY: I THINK ONE SHOWS FLEXIBILITY WHILE SEARCHING FOR SOME MOVEMENT, FOR FIRST MOVES. AND FLEXIBILITY MEANS FLEXIBILITY. I WON'T TRANSLATE IT INTO DETAILS OF WHAT WE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND.

21. Q. DOES THIS MEAN THAT WITHIN THAT BASIC APPROACH OF YOUR PROPOSALS OF NOVEMBER 8, IN THAT BASIC APPROACH, THERE IS ROOM FOR CERTAIN FLEXIBILITY IN CONNECTION WITH CERTAIN POINTS OF YOUR PROPOSAL?

A. WELL, I THINK IT WOULD BE MORE CORRECT TO SAY, IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT I SAID ABOUT LOOKING FOR A WAY OUT AND FINDING A FIRST, AN INITIAL SOLUTION, THAT THIS IMPLIES FLEXIBILITY ON BOTH SIDES OF COURSE.

2. Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, SPEAKING ABOUT FLEXIBILITY, WOULD YOU EXPECT FIRST AGREEMENTS RATHER IN THE FIELD OF ASSOCIATIVE (SIC) MEASURES, OR IN THE CENTRAL PROGRAMS?

A. I THINK THAT WE ARE DISCUSSING CENTRAL PROBLEMS.

Q. BUT WOULD THESE ASSOCIATIVE MEASURES BE A FIRST MOVE, AS YOU SAID BEFORE?

A. I THINK I WOULD PREFER NOT TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE DETAILS BY WHAT WE MEAN BY THE FIRST STEP. THAT WOULD TAKE ME INTO DETAILS, AND I CAN'T DO THAT.

23. Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, WOULD YOU RESTATE YOUR OBJECTIONS TO THE INITIAL WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR THE REDUCTION OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET FORCES.

A. YES, OF COURSE, I CAN. BUT HAVE THE STATEMENT. WHAT I SAID BASICALLY IS THAT WE COULD NOT BE SATIS- UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00181 03 OF 03 191234Z

FIELD WITH A REDUCTION IN A FIRST PHASE BY ONLY THE TWO POWERS. IN OUR VIEW IT DOES NOT CORRESPOND TO THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, IT DOES NOT MEAN EQUAL OBLIGATIONS WHICH ARE IMPLIED IN THE AGREED JOINT COMMUNIQUE, WHICH ARE IMPLIED IN THE STATUS OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND WHICH WE UNDERSTAND AS AN OBLIGATION OF ALL TO REDUCE. SPEAKING ABOUT JUST TWO IS NOT ENOUGH, AND ESPECIALLY, IF I MAY ADD, THAT FROM THE VIEW OF POLAND IT IS NOT ENOUGH. BECAUSE AS I SAID, THE BULK OF THE NATO FORCES WOULD BE LEFT INTACT IN THE FIRST PHASE. THAT IS A SOLUTION WHICH DOES NOT SATISFY US. IN READING THE LITERATURE ABOUT THE WESTERN PLAN, YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED THE COMMENTS FOR EXAMPLE THAT SAY THAT ONLY 25 PERCENT OF THE NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD BE AFFECTED BY FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS, AS AGAINST 50 PERCENT OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES.

24. Q. IS IT NOT SO THAT THIS IS A PACKAGE, THAT THE FIRST PHASE WOULD BE PART OF AN ENTIRE REDUCTION, ENCOMPASSING IN A SECOND PHASE OF COURSE OTHER FORCES.

A. THAT MAY WELL BE SO, AS CONCERNS THE CONCEPT OF THE WESTERN SIDE. BUT FOR US IT IS NOT FAIR, BECAUSE IT SAYS IN THE COMMUNIQUE THAT ANY AGREEMENT AT ANY POINT, AT ANY TIME SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY. AND THEIR CONCEPT IS NOT.

25. Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF YOUR FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS, WILL IT BE POSSIBLE TO CONTEMPLATE AN AMERICAN-SOVIET REDUCTION AS A FIRST STEP IN THAT FIRST PHASE.

A. OH, THAT IS MUCH TOO DETAILED A QUESTION. I DON'T THINK I CAN DISCUSS IT WITH YOU HERE NOW. I TRIED TO CONVEY OUR BASIC OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF THE TWO PHASES AS IT HAS BEEN PRESENTED. THAT IS, DIFFERENTIATING IN THE REDUCTION BY TWO AND BY THE REST.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 MBFR V 00181 03 OF 03 191234Z

26. Q. IS THIS A VALID QUESTION FOR CONSIDERATION AS WE LOOK AT A FLEXIBLE APPROACH?

A. I DON'T KNOW, I WOULD HAVE TO SEE.

27. Q. MR. AMBASSADOR, AM I RIGHT IN STATING THAT UNDER THE FIRST PHASE PROPOSAL BY THE WEST THAT THE RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE TO WITHDRAW 60,00 TROOPS (SIC) AND FIVE TANK DIVISIONS IN GERMANY, AND THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD WITHDRAW 20,000 (SIC). IS THAT RIGHT?

A. I WOULD NOT CONFIRM THE CORRECTNESS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS, BUT I THINK YOU ALL KNOW WHAT HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT IT IN THE PRESS.

28. Q. TO BE MORE SUBSTANTIVE, MR. AMBASSADOR, COULD YOU SAY THAT THE SUMMIT HAS GIVEN ANY APPRECIABLE IMPULSE TO THE TALKS, OR IS THE ATTITUDE BASICALLY THE SAME.

A. WELL, I THINK I HAVE ANSWERED THAT QUESTION ALREADY. I THINK THE SUMMIT HAS INDORSED OUR INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT. END TEXT OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS.RESOR

UNCLASSIFIED

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENT DRAFT, ARMED FORCES, GROUND FORCES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, FORCE & TROOP LEVELS, PRESS CONFERENCES, MEETING DELEGATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 19 JUL 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MBFRV00181
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740194-1117
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740735/aaaabdgt.tel
Line Count: 566
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 11
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: shawdg
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 SEP 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 SEP 2002 by ThomasVJ>; APPROVED <22 JAN 2003 by shawdg>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: STRULAK JULY 17, 1974, PRESS CONFERENCE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005